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This chapter examines the differences between political leadership in old and 
new democracies. It operationalises the concept of political leadership as the 
decision-making authority of the president and/or the prime minister in these 
systems. It adopts an institutionalist approach to the study of political leadership. 
It argues that different political institutions provide incentives for actors to 
behave in different ways. Taking old democracies to be those countries that have 
been continuously democratic since before the early 1990s and new democracies 
to be those that have democratised since this time, it shows that there are 
institutional differences between them. There has been a redistribution of regime 
types, with a decline in the number of parliamentary regimes and a rise in the 
number of semi-presidential regimes. This shift means that new democracies are 
more likely to have directly elected presidents and that there are now more 
complex patterns of political leadership than before with a greater emphasis on 
presidential/prime ministerial relations. In addition, the fragmentation of party 
systems in new democracies and the prevalence of proportional electoral systems 
has helped to generate a higher turnover of prime ministers in new democracies. 
Generally, prime ministers in new democracies tend to be weaker than their 
counterparts in new democracies. That said, it is important not overemphasise 
the differences. Within the set of parliamentary democracies patterns of decision 
making are recognisably similar in both old and new democracies. The same is 
true for presidential and semi-presidential democracies. Equally, even if the 
redistribution of regime types has generated changes in the general patterns of 
political leadership over time, there is variation within any given regime type 
and in any country across time. For example, even though there has been a 
general rise in semi-presidentialism, there is variation in the patterns of decision 
making within the set of semi-presidential democracies. Overall, while 
institutions create incentives for actors to behave in certain ways, their effect is 
not deterministic. The redistribution of regime types has generated new patterns 
of leadership, but there is always room for particular patterns of decision-making 
authority in any particular country. 
 
An institutionalist approach to the study of political leadership 
 
This chapter adopts an institutionalist approach to the study of political 
leadership (Cole, 1994; Elgie, 1995; Helms, 2004). While institutions can be 
understood in many different ways (Helms, 2013), this approach interprets 
institutions as sets of formal rules and established procedures. Institutions are 
not actors. Only people can act. However, institutions structure the behaviour of 
actors by providing incentives for them to behave in certain ways and to refrain 
from behaving in other ways. These incentives are not deterministic. Actors can 
always depart from them. Even so, an institutionalist approach places more 
emphasis on identifying the behaviour that is induced by institutions than on the 
idiosyncratic behaviour of human agents.i Institutions are privileged in this way 
because they are considered to induce incentives that are both systematic and 
regular. They are systematic in that the incentives can be clearly identified. For 
example, a first-past-the-post electoral system produces a strong incentive for the 
emergence of a two-party system. They are regular in that the incentives are 
general and not context-specific. So, all else equal, a first-past-the-post electoral 
system produces such an incentive everywhere and at all times. The result is that 
if institutional incentives can be correctly identified, then institutions can be used 
to explain and, indeed, predict political outcomes. Shepsle (2006, p. 29) puts it as 
follows: “outcomes are clearly implied by the configuration of rules in a 
structured institution. These rules prescribe the mechanism for aggregating 
behaviors into a final result. Thus, any combination of behavioral repertoires by 
institutional politicians maps into a specific outcome”. 
 This chapter privileges the study of institutions in the explanation of 
leadership outcomes. The focus is primarily on presidents, prime ministers, and 
legislatures rather than the incumbents who occupy these positions. The 
particular configuration of each leadership institution and the interaction 
between them provide incentives for actors to behave in different ways. These 
incentives can be deduced from a country’s constitution and/or the law. For 
example, a powerful directly elected president will expect to propose policy 
solutions to the country’s main problems, whereas a weak indirectly elected 
president will not be expected to do so. At the same time, institutions do not 
operate in isolation. Democracies operate according to the twin principles of the 
separation of powers and checks and balances. This means that different 
institutions may generate contradictory and/or competing incentives. For 
instance, a country with both a powerful directly elected president and a 
powerful fixed-term legislature is likely to find that the incumbents of both 
institutions will expect to propose policy solutions. These solutions may or may 
not be compatible. Viewed this way, leadership can be understood as the 
outcome of the competition between the various institutions in a country. While 
the precise configuration of the separation of powers and checks and balances is 
bound to vary from one country to another and, indeed, over time in any 
particular country, institutionalists identify similarities and differences in the 
general patterns of political leadership across countries. This chapter identifies 
differences in the patterns of political leadership between old and new 
democracies. In what ways are the institutional incentives in each of the systems 
different? How does the resulting decision-making authority of the various 
actors differ? 
 
Presidential and prime ministerial leadership in old and new democracies 
 
Identifying old and new democracies 
 
To what extent do institutional differences generate distinct patterns of decision-
making in old and new democracies? To begin, it is necessary to distinguish 
between these two sets of countries. For the purposes of this chapter, the set of 
current democracies is defined as those countries that have been awarded a 
Polity2 score of +6 or more for at least the last five consecutive years.ii Within the 
set of current democracies, the old democracies are defined as those countries 
that already had the status of a Freedom House Electoral Democracy in 1989, 
which is the first year that Freedom House records this status, whereas the new 
democracies are defined as those countries that have been awarded this status at 
some point since 1990 inclusive.iii Given this year corresponds to the standard 
beginning of the most recent wave of mass democratisations, it is a good cut-off 
point for distinguishing between old and new democracies. It should be noted 
that the Philippines and South Korea are included in the list of new democracies, 
even though they were both classed as Electoral Democracies in 1989. They are 
included because they democratised only at the very end of the 1980s. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to include them in the set of new democracies that emerged 
around this time. It should also be noted that this way of distinguishing between 
old and new democracies generates a set of seven hard-to-classify Latin 
American countries that democratised in the early and mid-1980s.iv These 
countries could be classed as old democracies partly because they democratised a 
few years prior to the wave of democratisation that occurred at the end of the 
1980s and in the early 1990s and partly because in most cases they had already 
had at least some experience of democracy prior to their most recent 
democratisation. However, these countries could also be classed as new 
democracies because their most recent democratisation was close in time to the 
post-1989 democratisations elsewhere. To ensure that any results are not biased 
by this classification rule, the findings are reported on the basis of classifying 
them as both old and new democracies. In most instances, the results scarcely 
vary in whatever way these countries are classified. Overall, these classification 
criteria generate 85 democracies in total. If the seven Latin American countries 
are classed as old, then there are 39 old democracies and 46 new democracies. If 
they are classed as new, then there are 32 old democracies and 53 new 
democracies.v (See Table 1.) 
 Table 1 about here 
  
Presidential leadership in old and new democracies 
 
What are the institutional differences between these two sets of countries and to 
what extent do any such differences generate distinct patterns of leadership? The 
first difference concerns the basic separation of powers. Here, a distinction can be 
made between presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems. A 
presidential system is where there is both a directly elected fixed-term president 
and a fixed-term legislature and where the cabinet is not responsible to the 
legislature. Under this system, there may be a prime minister, but, if so, then the 
prime minister is only individually responsible to the legislature or is not 
responsible at all. A parliamentary system is where the head of state is either a 
monarch or an indirectly elected president and where the prime minister and 
cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature. Under this system, the 
legislature may serve for a fixed term or, more usually, it may be dissolved by 
the prime minister. A semi-presidential system is where there is a directly elected 
fixed-term president and where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively 
responsible to the legislature. Under this system, the legislature may serve for a 
fixed term or it may be dissolved prematurely by either the president and/or the 
prime minister. A further distinction can be made within the set of semi-
presidential systems. A president-parliamentary system is where the prime 
minister and cabinet are responsible to both the legislature and the president. A 
premier-presidential system is where the prime minister and cabinet are 
responsible solely to the legislature. A small number of countries do not fit any 
of these basic classificatory systems. 
 Table 1 records the distribution of macro-level regime types of all 85 
democracies. There are clear institutional differences between the old and the 
new democracies. These differences are summarised in Tables 2a and 2b. The 
majority of old democracies have a parliamentary system. However, only a small 
percentage of new democracies have adopted such a system. There is a further 
difference within the set of parliamentary democracies that is not apparent from 
Table 1. Eleven of the old parliamentary democracies are monarchies and nine 
are republics.vi However, only one of the seven new parliamentary democracies is 
a monarchy (Lesotho). The general decline in parliamentarism has been matched 
by a sharp rise in semi-presidentialism. There has been a noticeable increase in 
both forms of semi-presidentialism, particularly president-parliamentarism. That 
said, new democracies are still twice as likely to be premier-presidential than 
president-parliamentary. The incidence of presidentialism varies as a function of 
whether the set of seven Latin American countries are classed as old or new 
democracies. If they are classed as old democracies, then the percentage of 
presidential democracies is remarkably similar across the set of old and new 
democracies. However, if they are classed as new, then there has been a large 
increase in the percentage of presidential democracies. Generally, the most 
noticeable difference between old and new democracies is the increase in the 
percentage of countries with directly elected presidents. Whatever way the seven 
Latin American countries are classified, around 80 per cent of new democracies 
have directly elected presidents compared with 43.7 per cent of old democracies 
if those seven countries are classed as old or 31.2 per cent if they are classed as 
new. Overall, in contrast to old democracies, directly elected presidents are the 
norm in new democracies. 
 Tables 1 and 2a and 2b about here 
 The redistribution of regime types means that political leadership is less 
parliamentarised in new democracies than in old democracies. What is the effect 
of such a redistribution? Unlike prime ministers, directly elected presidents do 
not require the ongoing support of the legislature to remain in office. As a result, 
presidents are more independent of the legislature than prime ministers. In 
presidential democracies, presidents may try to legislate by decree when faced 
with opposition in the legislature. They may try to rely on more fluid patterns of 
support among the deputies in the legislature rather than the more structured 
patterns of party or coalition support that usually occur under parliamentarism. 
In semi-presidential democracies, presidents often try to influence the behaviour 
of prime ministers, whereas they hardly ever do so in parliamentary 
democracies. Under semi-presidentialism, even during periods of French-style 
cohabitation when the parliamentary majority is explicitly opposed to the 
president, presidents still try to influence government policy, shape 
appointments to high public office, and so on. What is more, under president-
parliamentarism presidential influence is extremely high. Here, as Samuels and 
Shugart (2010) have shown, cohabitation almost never occurs under president-
parliamentarism. When presidents enjoy a parliamentary majority, they 
dominate the system. When they are opposed to the majority, they prefer to 
govern with independent prime ministers and with ad hoc majorities in the 
legislature rather than to allow the opposition to form the government. 
Generally, the rise of semi-presidentialism since the late 1980s has generated a set 
of countries in which the crucial relationship is just as likely to be between the 
president and the prime minister and/or between the president and the 
legislature as between the prime minister and the legislature, which is typically 
the case under parliamentarsim. 
  The different patterns of presidential leadership between old and new 
democracies can also be observed by examining the constitutional authority of 
presidents and legislatures. Siaroff’s (2003) index captures variations in 
presidential power. The Siaroff index is based on nine indicators of presidential 
power, including whether the president chairs cabinet meetings, whether the 
president can veto legislation passed by parliament, whether the president can 
invoke emergency powers, and so on. Siaroff then examines the actual power of 
presidents in various countries and records a score of 1 if a president enjoys the 
particular power in question and 0 otherwise. On this basis, countries emerge 
with a Siaroff score somewhere in a range from 0-9. Siaroff’s original paper 
(ibid.) provides scores for only 58 of the 80 presidential, semi-presidential and 
parliamentary democracies in this study. However, van Cranenburgh (2008) and 
Costa Lobo and Amorim Neto (2010) have coded various African countries. If 
their scores are included, then the number of countries increases to 62, 25 of 
which are old democracies if the seven Latin American countries are included in 
this category and 37 of which are new. Also, by definition, Siaroff’s index of 
presidential power excludes monarchies. If monarchies are included and given a 
Siaroff score of 0, then the total number of countries increases to 74 with the same 
number of old and new democracies. Table 3 reports the mean Siaroff scores for 
old and new democracies based on both whether or not monarchies are included 
and whether the seven Latin American democracies are classed as old or new. 
 Table 3 about here 
 The results clearly show that heads of state in new democracies have 
greater powers than their counterparts in old democracies. This is true whether 
the seven Latin American democracies are classed as old or new. Given the 
Siaroff index generates a 10-point scale, Model 1 shows that heads of state are 
around 25 per cent more powerful in new democracies relative to old 
democracies. When monarchies are excluded, Model 1 still shows that presidents 
are nearly 10 per cent more powerful in new democracies. Indeed, Model 2 
shows that presidents are more than 20 per cent more powerful in new 
democracies relative to old democracies when the seven Latin American 
countries are classed as new democracies and when monarchies are excluded. 
That said, these results merely reflect the general redistribution of regime types 
over time rather than an increase in the power of presidents/heads of state 
within specific regime types. Table 3 shows that under presidentialism and 
premier-presidentialism presidential powers are only marginally greater in new 
democracies relative to old democracies. The same is true for heads of state in 
parliamentary regimes. Indeed, when monarchies are excluded from this 
category, then the power of indirectly elected presidents does not vary across the 
set of old and new democracies. Instead, the reason why presidents/heads of 
state are generally more constitutional authority in new democracies than in old 
democracies is that there are now far more countries with directly elected 
presidents. Given these countries tend to have more powerful presidents than 
parliamentary republics and, certainly, parliamentary monarchies, then new 
democracies as a whole exhibit higher Siaroff scores than old democracies. 
Therefore, the primary emphasis should be on the impact of the redistribution of 
regime types across old and new democracies regime types, as above, rather than 
on the increase in presidential powers within individual regime types. 
 This point is confirmed when Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) parliamentary 
powers index (PPI) is substituted for the Siaroff scores. The PPI is based on 32 
indicators that capture the legislature’s ability to influence the executive and to 
act autonomously. The PPI ranges from 0 (a completely powerless legislature) to 
1 (a totally sovereign legislature).vii Fish and Koenig (2009) provide scores for 78 
of the 80 presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary democracies in this 
study. Table 4 presents the mean PPI scores for old and new democracies and for 
the different regimes types within them. Model 3 reports the results when the 
seven Latin American countries are classed as old democracies and Model 4 
reports the results when they are classed as new. There is highly negative 
correlation between the Siaroff scores and the PPI (-0.71). Therefore, 
unsurprisingly, the results confirm the general picture provided by the Siaroff 
scores. Model 3 shows that new democracies have legislatures that are around 5 
per cent weaker than their counterparts in old democracies. Model 4 shows that 
new democracies have legislatures that are nearly 10 per cent weaker.viii Again, 
though, the real difference lies with the redistribution of regime types over time. 
In presidential and parliamentary democracies the power of the legislatures is 
basically invariant over time. In premier-presidential countries legislatures are 
actually somewhat stronger in new democracies relative to old democracies, but 
still weaker than legislatures in both new and old parliamentary democracies. As 
with presidential power, the real change is with the emergence of a set of semi-
presidential countries, and particularly president-parliamentary countries, in the 
new democracies. These systems have weaker parliaments than their 
parliamentary counterparts. Generally, the substitution of semi-presidential 
legislatures for parliamentary legislatures accounts for the fact that the new 
democracies have somewhat weaker legislatures than old democracies. 
 Table 4 about here 
 This focus on regime types and the powers of presidents and legislatures 
points to a changing pattern of leadership over time. In old democracies there 
was a bipartite division between parliamentary regimes with weak heads of state 
and strong legislatures and presidential regimes with stronger heads of state and 
weaker legislatures. This division was unequal in that there were far more 
parliamentary regimes than presidential regimes. In new democracies, there is a 
tripartite division. There are presidential and president-parliamentary systems 
with strong heads of state and weak legislatures. There are premier-presidential 
systems with somewhat weaker, but nonetheless generally powerful heads of 
state and fairly strong legislatures. Finally, there is a small number of 
parliamentary republics with weak presidents and equally strong legislatures. In 
these ways, the universe of new democracies has more varied patterns of 
leadership. The majority of new democracies have to address incentives that flow 
from the presence of directly elected fixed-term legislatures. In presidential and 
president-parliamentary systems these incentives are particularly strong because 
legislatures have few countervailing powers. In premier-presidential systems 
there is a greater balance of power between presidents and legislatures. In these 
systems presidents are often prominent actors, but if they wish to act then they 
have to do so in concertation with both the legislature and a government and 
prime minister that are responsible to the legislature. In only a few new 
democracies are there familiar forms of prime-minister-centred parliamentary 
leadership. Overall, the changing distribution of regime types means that there 
are clear differences in the patterns of leadership between old and new 
democracies. 
 
Prime ministerial leadership in old and new democracies 
 
To this point, the focus has been on presidents and legislatures. What about 
prime ministerial leadership in old and new democracies? Leaving aside the five 
idiosyncratic regimes and classifying the seven Latin American countries as old, 
67.6 per cent of old democracies have prime ministers and 65.1 per cent of new 
democracies have prime ministers. In this way, the office of prime minister is just 
as prevalent in old democracies as in new ones. The substitution of semi-
presidential regimes for parliamentary regimes has scarcely altered the 
prevalence of prime ministerships. If the Latin American democracies are 
classified as new, then the percentage of countries with prime ministers has 
declined over time (83.3 per cent compared with 56.0 per cent). All the same, 
given these Latin American countries do not have prime ministers,ix the number 
of countries with prime ministers is relatively even across the set of old and new 
democracies (25 and 28 respectively).x This allows us to compare prime 
ministerial leadership in the two types of democracies. 
 To what extent are there different patterns of prime ministerial leadership 
in old and new democracies? In their work, Samuels and Shugart (2010) show 
that systems with directly elected presidents also have more presidentialised 
political parties. This characteristic impacts on prime ministerial leadership. For 
example, Samuels and Shugart (ibid., chap. 3) show that in parliamentary 
systems the prime minister, who is the principal political leader in the system, is 
much more likely to be an ‘insider’, meaning that they will have been the leader 
of their party at some point prior to assuming office, that they will have spent 
time on the party’s executive and that they will have been elected to the 
legislature, than is the case for presidents in presidential systems. However, in 
premier-presidential systems prime ministers are more likely to be outsiders 
than in parliamentary systems and in president-parliamentary systems insider 
prime ministers are hardly ever appointed. In addition, Samuels and Shugart 
also show that regime type makes a difference as to how principal political 
leaders leave power (ibid., chap. 4). Here, the key observation is that in 
parliamentary systems prime ministers are more likely to leave office as a result 
of inter-party problems (coalition collapse) and intra-party dissent (heaves 
against the leader) than is the case for prime ministers in semi-presidential 
systems. Needless to say, directly elected presidents are scarcely ever dismissed 
for these reasons. Moreover, within semi-presidential systems, prime ministers 
are more likely to leave office for reasons relating to the president in president-
parliamentary regimes than is the case in premier-presidential systems. Thus, the 
redistribution of regime types has had an effect not just on the power of 
presidents and legislatures, but also on the political background of the person 
who becomes the principal political leader in new democracies and also on the 
ways in which prime ministers leave office. 
The difference between old and new democracies can also be 
demonstrated in terms of the power of prime ministers. Unlike the situation for 
presidents, there are no general indices of prime ministerial power. Instead, the 
standard proxy for assessing the relative power of prime ministers is average 
duration in office (Baylis, 2007, p. 84). In this chapter, the average duration is 
calculated as the number of prime ministers in a country divided by the total 
number of days since the first prime minister to take office after 1 January 1990 
or since democratisation whichever is later until the date of the appointment of 
the current incumbent. The identification of prime ministers is taken from 
www.worldstatesmen.org. Prime ministers who headed governments that are 
officially identifed as caretaker governments are excluded. Reshuffles under the 
same prime minister and reappointments of the same person as prime minister 
without a break are not counted as separate periods. However, if the same 
person holds office on more than one occasion and there is a break, then each 
period is counted as a new prime ministership. To illustrate the methodology, 
the average duration of UK prime ministers is calculated as the number of prime 
ministers divided by the number of days from 28 November 1990 when the first 
prime minister to take office after 1 January 1990 assumed power until 11 May 
2011 when the current incumbent took power. There were three prime ministers 
during this 7,105-day period, giving an average duration of 2,368 days. The 
average duration of Romanian prime ministers is calculated as the number of 
prime ministers divided by the number of days from 1 October 1991 when the 
first prime minister under a democratic Romania assumed office until 22 
December 2008 when the current incumbent took up his position. There were 
seven prime ministers during this 6,293-day period, giving an average duration 
of 899 days. The average duration of prime ministers in old and new democracies 
and for each regime type is presented in Table 5. 
 Table 5 about here 
 The main conclusion to be drawn from Table 5 is that in the last 20 years 
prime ministers have remained in power for longer in old democracies than in 
new democracies. Indeed, the figures suggest that prime ministers have 
remained in office for almost twice as long during this period. With the caveat 
that the number of countries is very small, there is some evidence that in old 
democracies presidential intervention in semi-presidential systems may have 
made prime ministerial tenure shorter than in parliamentary systems. However, 
in new democracies average prime ministerial tenure varies very little across 
semi-presidential and parliamentary countries. Instead, the main reason for the 
difference in prime ministerial tenure lies in the party systems and electoral 
systems of old and new democracies. New democracies tend to have more 
fragmented party systems than old democracies. Moreover, Colomer (2005) has 
shown that the choice of electoral system is often endogenous, with the result 
that countries with few parties tend to choose plurality/majority systems and 
that countries with multi-party systems tend to choose proportional systems. 
This means that new democracies are more likely to choose proportional 
electoral systems that, in turn, are less likely to generate two-party, or two-block 
party systems. Using the International IDEA table of electoral systems as the 
source,xi the figures confirm this intuition. In old democracies, eight semi-
presidential and parliamentary countries have plurality/majority electoral 
systems, whereas in new democracies only two countries (Mali and Mongolia) 
have chosen such a system. To the extent that stable coalitions are less likely to be 
forthcoming when legislatures are more fragmented, then prime ministers in 
new democracies are likely to find that their security of tenure is less assured. 
This point applies to all new democracies. Whatever the type of regime, prime 
ministers have less security of tenure in new democracies relative to old 
democracies.  
 This observation has consequences for patterns of prime ministerial 
leadership. In the last 20 years, new democracies are less likely to have been led 
by prime ministers such as Tony Blair, Angela Merkel, or John Howard, who 
emerged in old democracies, headed stable dominant-party governments and 
stayed in office for long periods of time. Instead, new democracies are more 
likely to have been led prime ministers who headed multi-party coalition 
governments and who remained in office for a shorter period of time. Given 
prime ministers in new democracies have been more likely to lead multi-party 
governments, they may have had to spend more time in government managing 
the business of coalition politics. Also, the shorter tenure in office may have 
affected prime ministerial time horizons. They may have been more likely to 
front-load policy reforms. Finally, as noted in the previous section, in many 
young democracies prime ministers have had to manage a relationship with the 
president as well as with the legislature, generating an extra set of potentially 
destabilising institutional incentives. That said, policy making has not necessarily 
been more efficient in old democracies during the last 20 years. There is no 
reason why policy making in single-party governments is inherently better than 
in coalition governments. For example, when single-party governments alternate 
in power, the result can be wholesale policy reversals that may be socially and 
economically damaging. Moreover, even though prime ministerial turnover has 
been higher in new democracies, it may be the case that prime ministers from the 
same party have replaced each other or that prime ministers from different 
parties within the same coalition have replaced each other. If so, then high prime 
ministerial turnover may mask broader government stability. In addition, it 
should be remembered that in semi-presidential systems presidents serve for a 
fixed term, thus generating a degree of leadership stability even when there is 
turnover at the prime ministerial level. Overall, while it is certainly the case that 
in the last 20 years prime ministers in new democracies have spent less time in 
office than their counterparts in old democracies and while there is good reason 
to think that the shorter period in office has had considerable intra- and inter-
party ramifications, there is no reason to believe that the quality of prime 
ministerial leadership has necessarily been better in old democracies. 
  
Political leadership in old and new democracies 
 
There are different general patterns of leadership in new democracies when 
compared with old democracies. That said, it is important not to overestimate the 
differences between the two types of systems and for two reasons. Firstly, within 
each type of regime there are similarities between the patterns of political 
authority in both old and new democracies. For example, in parliamentary 
democracies the key leadership relationship is between the prime minister and 
the legislature. Prime ministers only remain in office for as long as they retain the 
confidence of the legislature. Moreover, given legislative politics is party politics, 
it follows that prime ministers only remain in office for as long as they retain the 
confidence of their own political parties. So, as Samuels and Shugart (2010) 
demonstrate, while prime ministers have remained in office for longer in old 
democracies, even long-serving prime ministers have to confront the ineluctable 
realities of parliamentary democracy. For example, in the UK, Tony Blair, who as 
party leader won an historic three consecutive elections for the Labour Party, 
was eventually obliged to step down because of intra-party pressure. In 
Australia, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was ousted by a vote of his parliamentary 
colleagues. Even if prime ministers in new democracies have tended to head less 
institutionalised and, therefore, perhaps more volatile political parties and even 
though multi-party coalitions in new democracies have not been not uncommon, 
prime ministers in both old and new democracies are aware that, at bottom, they 
serve in office at the favour of their party and the legislature. Therefore, while 
there are differences between old and new democracies as a whole, within the set 
of parliamentary democracies there are commonalities between them. 
The same point applies to presidential and semi-presidential regimes. For 
example, in semi-presidential democracies the key relationship is between the 
president, the prime minister and the legislature. Old semi-presidential 
democracies such as France and Portugal have experienced difficult periods of 
cohabitation when the president has been isolated in the executive, facing a 
prime minister and government from an opposing political coalition with 
majority support in the legislature. For their part, new democracies such as 
Bulgaria, Mongolia and Poland have faced equally challenging periods of 
cohabitation. In Romania, the onset of cohabitation coincided with a referendum 
on the impeachment of the president. In Lithuania President Rolandas Paksas 
was formally impeached during a period of cohabitation. Even outside 
cohabitation relations between the president and the prime minister have often 
been strained in both old and new semi-presidential democracies. In Portugal, 
the relationship between the president and prime minister is usually more 
conflictual outside cohabitation because presidents feel that they have greater 
legitimacy to intervene. In Central and Eastern Europe intra-executive conflict 
has also been a common feature of new semi-presidential democracies. Indeed, 
Sedelius and Ekman (2010, p. 525) have demonstrated that intra-executive 
conflict is a more powerful predictor of pre-term cabinet resignation in this 
region. Overall, therefore, while the redistribution of regime types has generated 
different patterns of leadership between old and new democracies, within any 
given regime type there are similarities between old and new democracies. 
 The second reason why the differences between old and democracies 
should not be overestimated is that there is variation in leadership patterns 
within any given regime type and indeed within any country over time. For 
example, while the average turnover of prime ministers in new democracies is 
greater than in old democracies, suggesting that political leaders are stronger in 
the latter than in the former, it is also the case that some old democracies are 
marked by weak prime ministers and that some new democracies have been 
characterised by strong leaders. In Japan, an old democracy, there has been a 
regular turnover of prime ministers and a strong leader has never really 
emerged. By contrast, in Hungary, a new democracy, a system of Chancellor 
Democracy has developed (Schiemann, 2006). In 2010 Viktor Orbán was 
appointed as prime minister with the support a large legislative majority that 
allowed him to amend the Hungarian constitution and further institutionalise 
strong leadership. Similarly, in Slovakia, also a new democracy, Vladimír Mečiar 
served as prime minister from 1992-1998. He was a dominating and controversial 
figure in Slovakia’s transition, personalising the political process (Haughton, 
2002). Therefore, while there are differences in political leadership between old 
and new parliamentary democracies as a whole, it is important not to imply that 
all new democracies operate in the same way or, indeed, that all countries within 
any given regime type in new democracies operate in the same way. 
 This point applies even more forcefully to semi-presidential and, 
particularly, premier-presidential regimes. In general, premier-presidential 
regimes are characterised by a dual executive in which there is both a fairly 
powerful president and a fairly powerful prime minister. This situation 
characterises old democracies, such as France, and new democracies, such as 
Bulgaria, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and Timor-Leste. However, within the set 
of both old and new democracies there are premier-presidential regimes with 
largely figurehead presidents and prime ministers who exercise leadership free 
from almost any presidential intervention. In Ireland, an old democracy, the 
president has very few powers and there is a strong head of government, the 
Taoiseach. In Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia, all new 
democracies, the directly elected president also has very few powers and, in 
practice, the prime minister is the principal political leader. This does not mean 
that the prime minister in these countries is necessarily a strong leader. In many 
of these new democracies, there has been considerable prime ministerial 
turnover. All the same, what these countries have in common is the absence of 
presidential leadership and only very rare examples of presidential/prime 
ministerial rivalry. In short, there is considerable variation within premier-
presidentialism. Thus, the typical pattern of leadership under premier-
presidentialism is not witnessed in all premier-presidential democracies. Overall, 
while it is reasonable to identify distinct patterns of leadership between old and 
new democracies, it is necessary to remember that such patterns represent 
general trends. There is always country-specific variation within these general 
trends. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Political leadership is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon. One way 
of interpreting the nature of leadership is to see it as the decision-making 
authority of the principal political office-holders in a country, typically 
presidents and/or prime ministers. Institutions shape the authority of these 
political leaders, creating incentives for them to behave in certain ways. A 
general set of institutional incentives are created by the basic separation of 
powers in a country. Presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes 
create different incentives. Across the set of old and new democracies there has 
been a redistribution of these regimes types, with directly elected presidents 
becoming much more prevalent than was previously the case. This redistribution 
of political authority has created basic differences in the patterns of leadership 
between old and new democracies. In new democracies there are stronger 
presidents, weaker legislatures and more complex relations generally between 
presidents, prime ministers and legislatures. In addition, new democracies have 
exhibited more fragmented party systems and have tended to adopt proportional 
electoral systems. These factors have combined to make it more likely that prime 
ministers remain in office for a shorter period of time when compared with old 
democracies. This does not mean that the quality of leadership has been worse in 
new democracies, but it has created a different political dynamic. All the same, 
within parliamentary democracies there are similarities between old and new 
democracies. The key relationship is still between the prime minister and 
parliament. Equivalent similarities can be found within the set of presidential 
and premier-presidential democracies as well. Moreover, institutional incentives 
are not deterministic. Even if the redistribution of regime types has generated 
differences in the general patterns of leadership between old and new 
democracies, there is variation within any given type of regime and indeed 
within any country over time. 
Notes 
                                                
i To put it another way, the impact of human agency on political outcomes will be 
found in the error term of a statistical equation, whereas the impact of 
institutions can be estimated directly. 
ii Note that the Polity IV dataset does not include countries with a population of 
fewer than 500,000 people. Therefore, this study does not include countries such 
as Iceland, Malta, or the Pacific island democracies. The Polity IV dataset with 
scores up to and including 2010 is available at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm, accessed 20 July, 2011. 
iii Freedom House only systematically records Electoral Democracies since 1989. 
So, 1990 is the first year in their dataset when additions to the set of Electoral 
Democracies can be identified. The list of Electoral Democracies is available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439, accessed 3 November 
2011. 
iv They are: Argentina (which received a Polity2 score of ≥6 in 1983), Bolivia 
(1982), Brazil (1985), El Salvador (1984), Guatemala (1986), Honduras (1982), and 
Uruguay (1985). 
v The case of the Solomon Islands is excluded because even though it 
democratised in the 1970s, it suffered a democratic breakdown in 2000. It has 
since redemocratised, but it is a moot point as to whether it should be classed as 
an old or new democracy. 
vi The 12 monarchies are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Jamaica, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
vii The data are available at: http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Datasets.htm, 
accessed 3 August 2011. 
viii Simple bivariate linear regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors show that there is no significant correlation between old democracies and 
the PPI as the dependent variable in Model 3. However, the relationship is 
significant at the 1 per cent level in Model 4. 
ix In Argentina, there is a head of government (jefe de gabinete), but the institution 
is only individually responsible to the legislature. 
                                                                                                                                            
x At the time of writing there had been no prime ministerial turnover in Lesotho. 
or Serbia. So, results for 26 new democracies are presented in Table 5. 
xi See http://www.idea.int/esd/world.cfm, accessed 18 August 2011. 
 
Table 1 Old and new democracies and regime types (2011) 
 
Old democracies New democracies 
Country 
 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Canada 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Ireland 
Regime type 
 
presidential 
parliamentary 
SP pres-parl 
parliamentary 
presidential 
other 
presidential 
parliamentary 
presidential 
presidential 
presidential 
parliamentary 
presidential 
presidential 
SP prem-pres 
SP prem-pres 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
presidential 
presidential 
parliamentary 
SP prem-pres 
Country 
 
Albania 
Benin 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cape Verde 
Chile 
Comoros 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Latvia 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Regime type 
 
parliamentary 
presidential 
SP prem-pres 
presidential 
SP prem-pres 
presidential 
presidential 
SP prem-pres 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
SP pres-parl 
presidential 
SP pres-parl 
other 
parliamentary 
presidential 
presidential 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
presidential 
SP prem-pres 
SP prem-pres 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Mauritius 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Turkey 
UK 
Uruguay 
USA 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
SP prem-pres 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
other 
parliamentary 
 
parliamentary 
parliamentary 
presidential 
presidential 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Timor-Leste 
Ukraine 
presidential 
SP prem-pres 
presidential 
parliamentary 
SP prem-pres 
SP prem-pres 
SP pres-parl 
other 
presidential 
presidential 
presidential 
SP pres-parl 
presidential 
SP prem-pres 
SP prem-pres 
SP pres-parl 
SP prem-pres 
SP prem-pres 
SP prem-pres 
other 
presidential 
SP pres-parl 
SP prem-pres 
SP pres-parl 
 
Source: 
For the identificaton of democracies, see 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm, and  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439. 
For the identification of presidential, parliamentary and other regimes, see 
http://bit.ly/qqPS0P. For the identification of semi-presidential regimes, see 
http://bit.ly/sAL2a3. 
Table 2a The distribution of regime types across old and new democracies 
with seven Latin American democracies classified as old 
 
 
Presidential 
Semi-
presidential 
president-
parliamentary 
Semi-
presidential 
premier-
presidential 
Parliamentary Other 
Old 
(n, %) 12 (30.8) 1 (2.6)   4 (10.3) 20 (51.3) 2 (5.1) 
New 
(n, %) 15 (32.6)  7 (15.2) 14 (30.4)   7 (15.2) 3 (6.5) 
 
Table 2b The distribution of regime types across old and new democracies 
with seven Latin American democracies classified as new 
 
 
Presidential 
Semi-
presidential 
president-
parliamentary 
Semi-
presidential 
premier-
presidential 
Parliamentary Other 
Old 
(n, %) 5 (15.6) 1 (3.1)   4 (12.5) 20 (62.5) 2 (6.3) 
New 
(n, %) 22 (41.5)  7 (13.2) 14 (26.4)   7 (13.2) 3 (5.7) 
 
Source: See Table 1 
Table 3 Mean Siaroff scores in old and new democracies with seven Latin 
American democracies classified as old (Model 1) and new (Model 2) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Old  
mean (n) 
New 
mean (n) 
Old 
mean (n) 
New 
mean (n) 
Presidential 
President-parliamentary 
Premier-presidential 
 
Parl. (incl. monarchies) 
Total (incl. monarchies) 
 
Parl. (excl. monarchies) 
Total (excl. monarchies) 
  6.75 (12) 
1.00 (1) 
3.75 (4) 
 
  0.60 (20) 
  2.95 (37) 
 
1.50 (8) 
  4.36 (25) 
  6.92 (12) 
7.14 (7) 
  4.33 (12) 
 
1.50 (6) 
  5.24 (37) 
 
1.50 (6) 
  5.24 (37)  
6.60 (5) 
1.00 (1) 
3.75 (4) 
 
  0.60 (20) 
  2.03 (30) 
 
1.50 (8) 
  3.39 (18) 
  6.89 (19) 
7.14 (7) 
  4.33 (12) 
 
1.50 (6) 
  5.50 (44) 
 
1.50 (6) 
  5.50 (44) 
 
Source: Siaroff (2003), van Cranenburgh (2008) and Costa Lobo and Amorim 
Neto (2010) 
Table 4 Mean PPI scores in old and new democracies with seven Latin 
American democracies classified as old (Model 3) and new (Model 4) 
 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Old  
mean (n) 
New 
mean (n) 
Old 
mean (n) 
New 
mean (n) 
Presidential 
President-parliamentary 
Premier-presidential 
Parliamentary 
Total 
  0.53 (12) 
0.72 (1) 
0.64 (4) 
  0.72 (20) 
  0.65 (37) 
  0.49 (15) 
0.52 (7) 
  0.70 (12) 
0.73 (7) 
  0.60 (41) 
0.51 (5) 
0.72 (1) 
0.64 (4) 
  0.72 (20) 
  0.68 (30) 
  0.50 (22) 
0.52 (7) 
  0.70 (12) 
0.73 (7) 
  0.59 (48) 
 
Source: Fish and Kroenig (2009) 
Table 5 Average prime ministerial duration in old and new democracies 
 
 Old 
mean days (n countries) 
New 
mean days (n countries) 
President-parliamentary 
Premier-presidential 
Parliamentary 
Total 
1442 (1) 
1370 (4) 
  1750 (20) 
  1677 (25) 
829 (7) 
  932 (13) 
837 (6) 
  882 (26) 
 
Source: www.worldstatesmen.org 
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